Potential Use of the Conservation Security Program to Encourage Diverse Crop Rotations in Eastern South Dakota by Dobbs, Thomas & Streff, Nicholas J
South Dakota State University
Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional
Repository and Information Exchange
Department of Economics Research Reports Economics
7-15-2006
Potential Use of the Conservation Security
Program to Encourage Diverse Crop Rotations in
Eastern South Dakota
Thomas Dobbs
South Dakota State University
Nicholas J. Streff
South Dakota State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_research
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and
Information Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Economics Research Reports by an authorized administrator of Open
PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and Information Exchange. For more information, please contact
michael.biondo@sdstate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dobbs, Thomas and Streff, Nicholas J., "Potential Use of the Conservation Security Program to Encourage Diverse Crop Rotations in
Eastern South Dakota" (2006). Department of Economics Research Reports. Paper 69.
http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_research/69
Potential Use of the Conservation Security 
Program to Encourage Diverse Crop Rotations 
in Eastern South Dakota 
by 
Thomas L. Dobbs and Nicholas J. Streff* 
July 2006 
South Dakota State University 
Economics Research Report 2006-1 
*Dobbs is a Professor of Agricultural Economics at South Dakota State University in 
Brookings, South Dakota. Streff is with the US Department of Agriculture's National 
Agricultural Statistics Service in Columbia, Missouri. 
Preface 
This research report provides greater detail on research methods and data than a 
companion paper that we presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American 
Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA). That paper, also authored by Thomas 
Dobbs and Nicholas Streff, is titled "Potential for the Conservation Security Program to 
Induce More Ecologically Diverse Crop Rotations in the Western Com Belt". The AAEA 
paper contains a more extensive policy discussion of the implications of our empirical 
findings. It can be accessed at: 
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/detailview.pl ?paperid= 16070. 
As we have explained in the present report, our assumptions about 
implementation of the Conservation Security Program (CSP) were based on the original 
(2002) legislation and information that was available by early 2004, before rules and 
payment rates were finalized for the first CSP signup. Actual implementation rules in the 
initial signup in 2004 and subsequent signups have differed from our assumptions in 
some important respects. We deal briefly with some of those differences in the AAEA 
paper cited above. An internship paper by Pauline Lenormand, a student from the Ecole 
Nationale Superieure Agronomique de Toulouse (France), contains an examination of 
CSP implementation rules for the second signup, which took place in 2005. Lenormand 
compared rules and payment rates in eligible South Dakota watersheds with rules and 
rates that were assumed for the analyses in our AAEA paper and the present research 
report. Her unpublished internship paper-"Implementation of the USA Conservation 
Security Program of the 2002 Farm Bill"-was supervised by Thomas Dobbs, and is 
available from him at: Thomas.Dobbs@sdstate.edu. 
The research on which this report is based was supported by the South Dakota 
State University Agricultural Experiment Station, under the Economics Department 
project "Agri-environmental Policy Options and Implementation Based on 
Multifunctionality". We appreciate the careful review of a draft version of this report by 
Dr. Gary Taylor. However, any remaining mistakes or shortcomings of the report are our 
responsibility. 
TLD and NJS 
July 2006 
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Potential Use of the Conservation Security Program to 
Encourage Diverse Crop Rotations in Eastern South Dakota 
by 
Thomas L. Dobbs and Nicholas J. Streff 
I. Introduction 
A central concern in many discussions of ecological sustainability in agricultural 
regions of the U.S. Midwest and Great Plains is that of crop system diversity. Many 
factors have contributed to the loss of crop system diversity over that last half-century 
(Dumke and Dobbs), one of which is public policy. The U.S. Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 ('2002 Farm Bill') provided for a new agri-environmental 
program that could have potential to help restore some of the crop system diversity that 
has been lost. The Conservation Security Program (CSP) is that program. This report, 
drawn from a Master of Science in Economics thesis by one of us (Streff), contains 
results of an examination of the CSP's potential to help induce more crop system 
diversity in southeastern South Dakota (SD). 
The Conservation Security Program (CSP) 
The CSP is an agri-environmental program intended to provide financial and 
technical assistance to producers who advance the conservation and improvement of soil, 
water, air, energy, and plant and animal life-as well as other conservation purposes--on 
Tribal and private working lands. The US Secretary of Agriculture's vision for the CSP 
was spelled out as follows: 
( 1) To identify and reward those farmers and ranchers meeting the very 
highest standards of conservation and environmental management on their 
operations; 
(2) To create powerful incentives for other producers to meet those same 
standards of conservation performance on their operations; and 
(3) To provide benefits for generations to come (NRCS, 2004, p. 10). 
The CSP established three tiers in which farmers could enroll land. A Tier 1 
contract would consist of a maximum annual payment of $20,000, and a 5-year contract 
that is renewable for 5 to 10 years with a possible upgrade to a higher tier level. Tier 1 
would require only partial farm enrollment, and the farmer would address one significant 
resource of concern for the enrolled portion of land. A Tier 2 contract would have a 
maximum annual payment of $35,000 and a 5 to 10-year contract that is renewable for up 
to 10 years. Tier 2 would require whole farm enrollment and would need to address at 
least one significant resource of concern for the entire operation. A Tier 3 contract would 
have a maximum annual payment of $45,000 with a 5 to IO-year contract that is 
renewable for up to 10 years. A Tier 3 contract would requires whole farm enrollment, 
and the farmer would have to apply a resource management system that addresses all 
resources of concern for the entire operation. Annual payments for each tier level are to 
consist of base payments, cost share payments, and enhanced payments. The payment 
rates would vary for each tier level (NRCS, 2003b). 
CSP assumptions for this study 
At the time the thesis on which this report draws was being completed in the 
spring of 2004, only the proposed CSP "rule," from the Federal Register, was available 
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for study. The proposed "rule" was published on January 2, 2004, and had a 60-day 
comment period that ended March 2, 2004. This proposed "rule" was a general outline of 
the CSP program. It identified five options for implementation of the CSP. The 
alternatives ranged from changing the rates for base and cost share payments to limiting 
the CSP enrollment to specific geographic regions in order to stay within budgetary 
constraints set for the CSP. For our analysis, the original framework for the CSP as 
designated in the 2002 Farm Bill and information from the proposed "rule" were used to 
develop the majority of the assumptions for the CSP. 
Study pumose 
The overall purpose of this study was to analyze the incentives in the 
Conservation Security Program for developing longer, more ecologically sustainable crop 
rotations for farming systems in the Western Com Belt. Specific research objectives were 
to: 
1) Develop a "representative" farm model for southeastern South Dakota, 
including ''typical" and alternative, longer crop rotations. 
2) Analyze the economic incentives for the operator of a "representative" 
southeastern South Dakota farm to use the CSP for longer crop rotations. 
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II. The Study Region in Eastern South Dakota 
The study area lies in southeastern South Dakota, covering much of the Big Sioux 
Aquifer (Figure 1 ). This area constitutes a major portion of the Big Sioux River drainage 
area in South Dakota. The aquifer underlying the Big Sioux River provides drinking 
water for a large portion of the state's population. Therefore, agricultural practices that 
potentially affect the river and underlying aquifer are of great interest to both farmers and 
the general public (Dobbs and Carr). This area is on the edge of the Western Corn Belt, 
with corn and soybeans being the dominant crops (Dumke and Dobbs). 
Major crops 
The six counties that were included in the study area are Moody, Minnehaha, 
Lincoln, Turner, Union, and Clay. Major crops grown in the six-county area during the 
last 5 years are shown in Figure 2. The major crops are corn and soybeans, and there also 
is a small but significant proportion of cropped land planted to alfalfa. The numbers 
represent the 5-year average (1997-2001) of the acres harvested for these crops. This is 
the average based on the total acres covered by these specific crops and does not include 
all cropland in the study area or pastureland. An earlier study by Dobbs and Carr detailed 
the profiles of Moody and Minnehaha Counties, which are the two northern counties in 
our study area. Dobbs and Carr showed that corn had been a major crop in these two 
counties since at least the 1950s. Soybeans did not become a major crop until the 1980s. 
Small grain acreage diminished significantly over the same time period. 
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Figure 2. Six-County Study Region Profile: 
1997-2001 Average Acres Harvested 
Oats Acras Harveliled 
0.6% 
Alfalfa Acres Harvested 
6.3% 
All Wheal Acres Harvested 
0.4% 
Com Acres Harvested 
44.3% 
Source: SDASS 1998-2002 
Soybean Acras Harvested 
48.5% 
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Soybeans had the largest proportion of harvested acres in the study area in 1997-
2001, with a 5-year average of nearly 49 percent (Figure 2). Com was the second most 
common crop, accounting for 44 percent of the total acres harvested. Alfalfa had the 
third largest 5-year average, at 6 percent. For small grains, oats had a 5-year average of 
less than 1 percent. Wheat did not account for a significant number of harvested acres, 
but nonetheless was included in the analysis. Wheat acres expanded some in Moody 
County during the 1970s when wheat prices rose significantly (Dumke and Dobbs), and 
wheat continues to have good agronomic potential for crop rotations in southeastern SD 
that include small grains. 
Farm sizes 
The average farm size for the study area was determined using 1997 Census of 
Agriculture data for South Dakota (data from the 2002 Census had not yet been released 
when the profile was constructed). The average farm size for each county is presented in 
Table 1. Using the total acres of land in farms and the total number of farms for the six-
county area, an average farm size of 438 acres was established. However, farms with 260 
to 499 acres represent only 20 percent of the farms and 17 percent of the land within the 
study area. To capture a larger portion of land within the study area, the "representative" 
farm size range was assumed to be 500-1,999 acres. Based on 1997 Census of 
Agriculture data, this range captures almost 30 percent of the number of farms and over 
60 percent of the land within the study area. 
7 
Table 1. Study Region Farm Size Analysis, by County 
Minnehaha Moody Clay Lincoln Turner Union Total 
Number of Farms 1125 549 397 806 832 494 4203 
Land in Farms 406280 283783 225902 318707 352353 254028 1841053 
Farm Size 361 517 569 395 424 514 438 
Farm Size Analysis 
Farms w/ 260-499 
Acres 204 119 81 161 188 92 845 
Total Acres 77555 43119 30495 60507 68983 33517 314176 
Percent of Total 
Farms 18.13% 21.68% 20.40% 19.98% 22.60% 18.62% 20.10% 
Percent of Total 
Acres 19.09% 15.19% 13.50% 18.99% 19.58% 13.19% 17.07% 
Farms w/ 500-999 
Acres 175 114 105 155 194 107 850 
Total Acres 120997 80332 76186 105200 133378 74593 590686 
Percent of Total 
Farms 15.56% 20.77% 26.45% 19.23% 23.32% 21.66% 20.22% 
Percent of Total 
Acres 29.78% 28.31% 33.73% 33.01% 37.85% 29.36% 32.08% 
Farms w/ 1000-1999 
Acres 83 72 54 66 64 68 407 
Total Acres 107976 98604 72339 82778 86734 89587 538018 
Percent of Total 
Farms 7.38% 13.11% 13.60% 8.19% 7.69% 13.77% 9.68% 
Percent of Total 
Acres 26.58% 34.75% 32.02% 25.97% 24.62% 35.27% 29.22% 
Farm w/ 2000+ 
Acres 19 10 12 9 7 14 71 
Total Acres 48528 36049 29590 25872 23140 34877 198056 
Percent of Total 
Farms 1.69% 1.82% 3.02% 1.12% 0.84% 2.83% 1.69% 
Percent of Total 
Acres 11.94% 12.70% 13.10% 8.12% 6.57% 13.73% 10.76% 
Grouping Farm 
Sizes* 
Farms w/ 500-1999 
Acres 258 186 159 221 258 175 1257 
Total Acres 228973 178936 148525 187978 220112 164180 1128704 
Percent of Total 
Farms 22.93% 33.88% 40.05% 27.42% 31.01% 35.43% 29.91% 
Percent of Total 
Acres 56.36% 63.05% 65.75% 58.98% 62.47% 64.63% 61.31% 
• Farms with 259 acres of land or less are not shown here, but the percentage calculations are based on all 
farms, including those in the smallest category. 
Source: NASS 1997 Census of Agriculture 
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Based on the above information, the average farm size of 438 acres does not 
sufficiently represent the farms within the study area. The Census data suggest that a 
farm between 500 and 1,999 acres provides a more complete representation of the study 
area. A 1,000-acre farm was determined to best represent the study area. 
The 1997 Census of Agriculture data also suggested that the typical farm in the 
study area did not have a livestock enterprise. The data indicated that 34 percent of the 
4,203 farms in the study area had beef cattle and only 14 percent of the farms had swine 
included as part of the operation. 
Using 1997 Census of Agriculture and National Agricultural Statistics Service 
data, a "representative" farm for the study area was determined to have 1,000 cropland 
acres and no livestock enterprises. Based on cropland acres planted and harvested data of 
the major crops in the study area (Figure 2), soybeans and com are the two major crops 
for the area, covering 93 percent of the cropland harvested based on the 1997-2001 
average of the major crops. Alfalfa was a distant third, accounting for 6 percent of the 
land under major crops within the six-county region, and oats and wheat acreage each 
made up less than 1 percent. 
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III. Methods for Representative Farm Analysis 
The "representative" farm for the study region was developed using the study 
region profile presented in section II, previous SDSU research, SDSU Extension 
Economist expertise, County Extension Educator interviews, and interviews with 
farmers. Although the size of the farm has now been specified, other features of the 
''representative" farm-such as crop rotation and tillage practices-also had to be 
specified. The following information covers the steps taken to develop the 
"representative" farm and the associated enterprise budgets. 
The 'representative farm' 
The "representative" rotation for the study region was determined to be a com and 
soybean rotation. The need for small grains and forage has declined, since most of the 
farmers within the study area do not have livestock enterprises. In addition, commodity 
prices and Federal farm program payments for cash crops such as soybeans and com have 
been appealing to many producers. 
"Conventional tillage," used by the majority of farmers in the study region, was 
determined to be a tillage system consisting of chiseling com stalks and small grain 
stubble after fall harvest and either field cultivating or disking soybean and wheat residue 
in the spring as needed to incorporate fertilizer and herbicides during seedbed 
preparation. Conventional tillage, as defined for this study, does not include a moldboard 
plow. Interviews suggested that no-till farming systems are also frequently used, 
especially when planting soybeans. In the case of the com-soybean rotation, drilled 
soybeans, which include soybeans planted in less than 30-inch rows with a no-till drill or 
10 
air seeder, were just as common as conventionally planted soybeans in 30-inch rows in 
some parts of the study area. We decided to include both a conventionally rowed 
soybean system and a system in which soybeans are no-till drilled in 15-inch rows. 
The tillage system of a farm can play a large role in the bottom-line for the 
operation, but with the increased use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in seed 
varieties, the seed type can also play a role in the profitability of the operation. The 
primary types of seeds planted in the study region are varieties of GMO com and GMO 
soybeans. Results of interviews indicated that Bt com, which includes a gene that makes 
the plant produce a substance that kills the European com borer, was the most common 
type of com planted. Roundup Ready (RR) soybeans, which have an added gene that 
inhibits the effects of the quickly-degrading Roundup herbicide, was the most commonly 
planted soybean seed variety in the study region. 
Use of 'Cost and Returns Estimator' (CARE) program 
The assumptions for yields, prices, machinery use, and land charges were entered 
into the Cost and Returns Estimator (CARE) program to calculate each crop's enterprise 
budget. CARE was developed by the USDA's Natural Resource Conservation Service, 
and is designed to evaluate the costs and returns for growing a specific crop or crop 
rotation. Other cost assumptions such as interest costs, insurance costs, pesticide costs 
and application amounts, fuel costs, and management costs were obtained from budgets 
developed by Peterson. When budgets needed to be altered with respect to fertilizer, 
recommendations were obtained from Gerwing and Gelderman. 
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Repair costs for machinery were based on long-run average repair costs; that is, 
the estimated total repair cost over the life of a machine was divided by its total hours of 
use. This number was used to calculate the repair cost per acre. As a result, these 
budgets likely overstate repair costs for newer machines and understate repair costs for 
older machines. The algorithms used for calculating machine costs were developed by 
the American Society of Agricultural Engineers, and the prices used for those algorithms 
were obtained from Lazarus and Selley. 
An enterprise budget was developed for each crop. In some cases, a specific crop 
had multiple budgets, differing with each rotation. Input costs such as fertilizer expense 
sometimes vary for a single crop with multiple budgets, depending in part on the fertilizer 
credits from previous crops in the rotation. Yield and price assumptions for each crop did 
not vary with rotation, except for the organic system prices and yields, which were 
adjusted based on results of previous studies. 
Alternative and organic crop rotations 
After formulating the "representative" farm for the study region and a baseline 
rotation, alternative and organic crop rotations were formulated for CSP analyses and 
comparisons with baseline systems. The alternative and organic rotations include 
rotations of various lengths and crop mixes. Information from County Educator and 
farmer interviews, together with data from SDSU' s Southeast South Dakota Experiment 
Farm, were used to specify alternative rotations. The alternative and organic rotations 
were compared to the baseline com-soybean rotation, to measure profitability and the 
potential effects of CSP payments. 
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Winter wheat was added to the com-soybean rotation to make it a 3-year rotation. 
A similar 3-year rotation was developed using spring wheat. Although winter and spring 
wheat are not major crops in the study region-nor have they been over most of the last 
50 years (Dobbs and Carr}-the comments from interviewees suggested that if small 
grains were added to the com and soybean rotation, wheat would be the first choice. 
There was no clear preference between spring and winter wheat. The com-soybeans-
spring wheat rotation models a rotation that is being studied at the Southeast Experiment 
Farm. 
Alfalfa was included in several rotations. Alfalfa represents the third largest crop 
acreage harvested in the study area. Research has shown that alfalfa sometimes enhances 
the profitability of farming systems (Henning and Dobbs, Mends and Dobbs). Alfalfa 
also is included in current rotation studies at the Southeast Experiment Farm. Alfalfa was 
both straight-seeded and planted with a nurse crop in the enterprise budgets, because 
interview data and past research did not provide a clear consensus about how alfalfa is 
typically planted in the study area. Oats and spring wheat were used as nurse crops for 
alfalfa in the rotations we analyzed. 
Oats represent the largest acreage harvested for any small grain in the study 
region. Oats account for less than 1 percent of the harvested acres in the study area (of 
the six major crops considered). County Educators and farmers indicated that oats are 
primarily used as a nurse crop for alfalfa. 
Organic rotations also were developed for analysis. The organic rotations were 
developed in part from recent studies in Minnesota and Iowa. In the Minnesota study, 
13 
Porter et al. compared 2 and 4-year crop rotations. The rotations included a 4-year com-
soybean-oatlalfalfa-alfalfa organic rotation. The Iowa study included a similar 4-year 
rotation (Delate et al.). Both studies concluded that organic rotations are competitive 
with conventional corn-soybean rotations under normal growing conditions. Porter et al. 
concluded that while there was a reduction in both corn and soybean yields in the 4-year 
organic rotation compared to a conventional 2-year com-soybean rotation, the organic 
rotation had lower production costs than the conventional rotation; consequently, net 
returns for the two rotations, without taking into account organic price premiums, were 
roughly equivalent. The results of Porter et al. and Delate et al. are consistent with those 
of several other studies conducted at land-grant universities in the Midwest, and suggest 
that organic production systems can be competitive with conventional production systems 
under at least some conditions. 
The baseline, alternative, and organic rotations that were analyzed are listed in 
Table 2. The rotations ranged in length from the 2-year corn-soybean rotation used as the 
baseline to an 8-year oats/alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-corn-soybeans-corn-soybeans 
rotation. Some rotations included both GMO and non-GMO seed varieties. Only one 
rotation, baseline 2, had no-till soybeans; otherwise, all rotations with soybeans were 
assumed to be planted with a min-till planter in 30-inch rows. The organic rotations 
follow National Organic Program guidelines and practices commonly accepted for 
organic certification-the use of manure for fertilization, no synthetic chemical pesticides 
or insecticides, and use of certified organic seed (non-GMO). 
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Table 2. Baseline, Alternative, and Organic Rotations Evaluated 
Baseline Rotations* 
Baseline 1 
Baseline 2 
Com-Soybeans 
--Soybeans planted in 30-inch rows 
Com-Soybeans 
--Soybeans planted w/ no-till drill in 15-inch rows. 
Alternative Rotations* 
A. Com-Soybeans-Spring Wheat 
B. Com-Soybeans-Winter Wheat 
C. Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Com-Soybeans-Com-Soybeans 
D. Oats/Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Com-Soybeans-Com-Soybeans 
--This rotation is evaluated with both GMO and conventional 
seed varieties. 
E. Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Com-Soybeans-Winter Wheat 
--This rotation is evaluated with both GMO and conventional 
seed varieties. 
F. Spring Wheat/ Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Com-Soybeans 
--This rotation is evaluated with both GMO and conventional 
seed varieties. 
G. Oats/ Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Com-Soybeans-Com 
Organic Rotations** 
A. Com-Soybeans-Oats/ Alfalfa-Alfalfa 
B. Com-Soybeans-Oats/ Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa 
*Baseline and alternative rotations use GMO seed varieties unless otherwise noted. 
**Organic rotations use certified organic seed varieties. 
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Major budgeting assumptions 
Budgeting assumptions about machinery costs, crop prices, yields, and land 
charge were as follows. 
Machinery costs. It was assumed, regardless of rotation, that the same size and 
type of implement would be used for any given tillage practice. We also assumed that an 
implement would be used for the same number of acres or hours per year, regardless of 
rotation. This was done to isolate differences in enterprise costs due to differences in 
tillage practices, rather than to differences in efficiency of machinery use. In other words, 
costs per acre of any given machinery operation (such as disking com stubble) were 
assumed to be the same wherever the operation was applicable, regardless of the crop 
rotation. Machine costs for fall tillage operations were included in costs for crops planted 
and harvested in that same calendar year. Lazarus and Selley provided the information 
for machinery replacement costs and labor charges used in the enterprise budgets. 
Prices. The crop price assumptions were based on data from May and Diersen 
(2003). The prices used in the enterprise budgets were the South Dakota 5-year (1997-
2001) average prices for each commodity, since 2001 was the most recent year with 
complete price data available at the time calculations were made. The prices used in the 
enterprise budgets are shown in Table 3. 
In the case of the organic rotations, an organic premium is included in some of the 
selling prices for organically produced crops. Streff and Dobbs reported price 
comparisons for organically grown crops and conventionally grown crops. An organic 
farm price-to-South Dakota cash price ratio was established for com, soybeans, and oats 
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from 1998 through 2002. The organic prices used for the enterprise budgets were 
calculated by talcing the 5-year average organic farm and South Dakota cash price ratios 
and applying the ratios to the conventional prices used in the enterprise budgets. The 
organic premiums were discounted to account for the 3-year transition period required for 
a farmer to become certified organic, at which time they are eligible for the organic 
premium. Based on a 10-year time frame, a farmer transitioning from conventional to 
organic practices would be eligible for the organic premium 8 of 10 years, or 80 percent 
of the time. Therefore, the prices used for organic crops reflected the assumption that 
conventional prices would be received 20 percent of the time. Organic prices shown in 
Table 3 reflect that transition period adjustment. Table 4 shows the organic farm-to-
South Dakota cash price ratios. 
Yields. A 5-year average per acre yield was calculated for each crop in the study 
region. This 5-year average was used as the per acre yield in each crop's enterprise 
budget. With the exception of organic systems, the yield for each crop was assumed to 
be the same for each rotation, which means corn in the baseline rotation yields the same 
as corn in an 8-year rotation. Also, it was assumed that yields are the same in different 
tillage systems. The yields for each crop are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Crop Yield and Price Assumptions 
Cro Yield bu/ac 
124 
37 
44 
32 
46 
Tons/ac. 
Alfalfa Yr. 1 ** 1.50 
Alfalfa Yr. 2-3 4.50 
4.00 
Or anic Alfalfa Yr. 1·- no-cuttin 
Or anic Alfalfa Yr. 2-3 4.05 
Price 
$/bu 
$1.75 
$4.77 
$3.03 
$3.03 
$2.59 
$1.30 
$3.30 
$12.47 
$2.07 
Price $/ton. 
*Spring wheat seeded with alfalfa only spring wheat is harvested 
**Alfalfa straight seeded or with oats has the same yield Alfalfa Yr.1 
***Organic alfalfa is seeded with oats only the oats are harvested in Org. Alfalfa Yr.1 
Table 4. Organic Farm-to-South Dakota Cash Price Ratios 1998-2002 
Crop Ratio 
Corn 2.106 
Sovbeans 3.016 
Oats 1.740 
Source: Streff and Dobbs 
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Porter et al. indicated that organically grown com yields were, on average, 92 
percent of the conventionally grown com yields in their study. Also, their organically 
grown soybean yields were approximately 83 percent of conventional yields. Porter et al. 
also found that organic alfalfa yield was 92 percent of the conventional yield, but organic 
oats yields were similar to conventional yields. The average organic com yield reported 
in Delate et al. was 96 percent of the conventional yield, and the average organic soybean 
yield was higher than the conventional yield. To present a conservative approach to the 
organic rotations, we utilized ratios similar to those of Porter et al.-90 percent for corn 
and alfalfa and 84 percent for soybeans. The yields for each organic crop are presented 
in Table 3. 
Land charge. The land charge used for the enterprise budgets was the 2003 
average cropland cash rental rate for the six-county area as reported by SDASS (2003), 
approximately $90 per acre. Our analysis compares each crop rotation's profitability on 
the same "representative" farm, assuming land charges and other land ownerships costs 
are not affected by the rotation selected. 
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IV. Policy Assumptions for Analyses 
Prior to conducting the analyses, policy asswnptions had to be established. These 
asswnptions are described next, first for so-called 'commodity program' provisions and 
then for the CSP. 
Commodity program assumptions 
Since this study focused on the potential incentives for a "representative" farmer 
to switch from a baseline rotation to an alternative or organic rotation, Federal farm 
program payments asswnptions-which include direct payments (DPs), counter-cyclical 
payments (CCPs), and loan deficiency payments (LDPs}-had to be the same for all 
rotations developed and analyzed. The 2002 Farm Bill left producers with several options 
to update base acres and payment yields used for certain commodity program payments. 
For this analysis, the producer was asswned to update his or her base acres and payment 
yields with the baseline rotation of com or soybeans in mind. 
Direct payments. Direct payments are decoupled from current prices and 
production and are determined by the base acres and base yields. DP rates are per bushel 
payments that were to remain fixed over the life of the 2002 Farm Bill. We asswned that 
the base acres were updated to reflect the average acres planted, plus those prevented 
from planting due to weather conditions, during crop years 1998-2001. In the case of the 
"representative" farm with a com-soybean rotation, a base of 500 acres of com and 500 
acres of soybeans was asswned. 
The payment yield for the "representative" farm for com was obtained from Farm 
Service Agency (FSA) data for the study region. The com payment yield was determined 
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to be 85 bushels/acre. The soybean payment yield was derived as outlined in the FSA 
Direct Payment guidelines. That yield (29 bushels/acre) was calculated as the 1998-2001 
average yield for the study region, backed up to equivalent 1981-1985 yields, or 
approximately 78 percent of the current yield. 
Counter-cyclical payments. Counter-cyclical payments are available for covered 
commodities whenever the effective price is less than the target price. Target prices were 
fixed for 2002-2003, and rose for most commodities for 2004-2007. The payment amount 
is equal to the product of the payment rate, the payment acres (85 percent of base acres), 
and the payment yield. The payment rate for a commodity is the target price minus [(the 
higher of the average national loan rate or the average national yearly price) plus the 
direct payment]. CCPs are intended to support and stabilize farm income when 
commodity prices are less than target prices. 
According to the FSA data, most South Dakota farmers updated their based acres 
according to the 1998-2001 average acreage planted. Most South Dakota producers also 
chose to update their counter-cyclical payment yields to 93.5 percent of the farm's 1998-
2001 average yields. The base acres for com and soybeans remained the same, at 500 
acres each, but the base yields were updated to 93.5 percent of the 1998-2001 average 
com and soybean yields for the study region. Assuming the operator of our 
representative farm did the same, the payment acreage base was 500 acres each of com 
and soybeans, and payments were based on 85 percent of those acreages. CCP yields 
were 121 bushels for com and 35 bushels for soybeans. 
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Loan deficiency payments. LDPs are coupled to current production and prices. 
Producers can take LDPs any day after harvesting their crop and before losing beneficial 
interest in the commodity. The LDP is equal to the loan rate minus that day's posted 
county price (PCP). In the case of our "representative" farm, the PCP for each 
commodity was assumed to be the same as the 5-year average (non-organic) price used in 
the enterprise budgets (Table 3). The loan rates used to determine the LDPs were the 
average 2002 loan rates for the six-county area that we obtained from FSA data. We 
assumed that the operator of the representative farm received an LDP for a commodity if 
the loan rate was greater than the PCP. 
Conservation Security Program assumptions 
Payments for the CSP consist of three types. First, there is a base payment. The 
base payment was supposed to be based on the average national per acre rental rate for a 
specified use during 2001 or an appropriately adjusted rate to ensure regional equity 
(NRCS, 2004). 
The second portion of a CSP payment was to be derived from the average county 
cost of adopting or maintaining the practice for the 2001 crop year. Average county costs 
were to be determined by the US Secretary of Agriculture. A cost share payment could 
cover up to 75 percent (up to 90 percent for beginning farmers) of the cost of maintaining 
or implementing a practice (NRCS, 2004). 
The third portion of a CSP payment is an "enhanced payment." Enhanced 
payments were to be determined by the Secretary and involve payments for producers 
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who exceed contract expectations, such as by participating m on-farm conservation 
research (Duffy; NRCS, 2004). 
CSP framework. In establishing our CSP assumptions, we used tier definitions 
and base payment levels as specified in the original legislative language. We applied the 
CSP to each alternative and organic rotation, but not to the baseline rotations. The CSP 
payment rates varied for each rotation because the rotations were assumed to be enrolled 
in different tiers. 
Base payments were to be derived from the 2001 average national per-acre rental 
rate or a related regional or local rate to prevent geographical bias. According to 
legislation, the base payment for Tier 1 was to be 5 percent of the rental rate, but the 
payments could not exceed $5,000. The base payment for Tier 2 was to be 10 percent of 
the rental rate, not to exceed $10,500. The base payment for Tier 3 was to be 15 percent 
of the rental rate, not to exceed $13,500 (NRCS, 2003b). 
For our analyses, the 2001 average cropland cash rental rate for the six-county 
area (as published by the SDASS) was used. This was $84 per acre. The legislative 
language specified that 2001 data would be used for the life of the program regardless of 
the actual year (NRCS, 2003b). 
Each rotation (other than the baseline rotations) was enrolled in Tier 1, 2, or 3, 
based on definitions set forth in the CSP legislation and assumptions that we made about 
the potential environmental gains each rotation might provide. A Tier 1 contract would 
receive a base payment per acre enrolled equal to 5 percent of the $84 rental rate, or 
$4.20 per acre. A Tier 2 contract base payment would be equal to 10 percent of the $84 
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rental rate, or $8.40 per acre. A Tier 3 contract would receive a base payment equal to 15 
percent of the $84 rental rate, or $12.60 per acre. 
The base payments rates were subject to change by the time CSP rules were 
finalized. Our assumed payment rates were based on the original CSP legislation. 
Alternatives that were under consideration implied substantially lower base payments 
(NRCS, 2003a). In fact, rules used in initial CSP signups have not allowed base (now 
called "stewardship") payment rates as high as allowed in the legislation and assumed in 
our analyses. 
According to the CSP legislation, both costs of new practices and costs of 
maintaining existing practices can be eligible for cost share payments (NRCS, 2003b ). 
Although the cost share payments were under review by policymakers when our analyses 
were conducted, and the payments could be reduced to only 5 percent cost share, we 
assumed 75 percent cost share as allowed in the original legislative language. The cost 
share payments were applied only to rotations that contain alfalfa, since the establishment 
costs for alfalfa tend to be relatively high. The cost share payments for alfalfa included 
only the establishment costs. Establishment costs include spring tillage operations, 
fertilizer, seed, and planting. We assumed that a farmer participating in the CSP would 
receive a payment equal to 75 percent of the alfalfa establishment costs. 
Enhanced payments, according to the CSP legislation, may be provided if the 
CSP's activities will increase conservation performance as a result of additional effort 
made by the producer that: improves a resource of concern to a condition that exceeds the 
minimum eligibility requirements for the participant's tier of participation or for other 
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actions; addresses local conservation priorities in addition to the concerns for the 
agricultural operation; or involves the producer in research and demonstration projects, 
cooperation with other producers to implement watershed or regional conservation plans 
covering at least 75 percent of the targeted area, or assessment and evaluation activities 
relating to practices included in a conservation security plan. Rates for the enhanced 
payments had not been determined at the time our analyses were conducted. Therefore, 
we did not include them. Although farmers adopting some of our alternative and organic 
systems might be eligible for enhanced payments, without clear guidelines for estimating 
payment rates at the time of our analyses, a defensible method for specifying payment 
rates could not be established. 
Resources of concern. A CSP contract must address resource concerns faced by a 
farm operation. Resource concerns may include, but are not limited to: soil erosion, 
water quality/quantity, air quality (wind erosion), animal grazing productivity, or wildlife 
(NRCS, 2003a). The main resource concerns outlined in the proposed "rule" were water 
quality/quantity and soil erosion. To achieve the goal of maintaining the resource of 
concern at a non-degradation standard, which means maintaining the resource at a level 
adequate to protect and prevent degradation, the producer may employ any number of 
conservation practices outlined and approved by the NRCS. The proposed "rule" 
asserted that the CSP might be limited to sensitive aquifer areas (such as the Big Sioux 
Aquifer). However, in our analyses, we assumed that the CSP would not be limited to 
particular geographic areas or specifically to soil and water concerns. 
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In our study, we were concerned with the conservation practice of a resource-
conserving crop rotation. We assumed that alternative and organic rotations would fall 
within the guidelines for a resource-conserving crop rotation. A resource-conserving crop 
rotation or conservation crop rotation is defined as a crop rotation that includes at least 
one resource-conserving crop, reduces erosion, improves soil fertility and tilth, interrupts 
pest cycles, and reduces depletion of soil moisture (Harkin et al.). By definition, this 
means growing various crops in a planned sequence. This sequence may involve 
growing high residue producing crops such as corn or wheat in rotation with low residue 
producing crops such as vegetables or soybeans, as stated in the NRCS Field Office 
Technical Guide (FOTG). 
Alternative rotations A and B may not qualify as resource-conservmg crop 
rotations, since they may not have a large or diverse enough crop mix to provide 
sufficient environmental benefits. However, we assumed that rotations A and B each 
would be eligible for a Tier 1 CSP contract. Alternative rotations C through G and the 
organic rotations that we considered, in our view, clearly should be considered resource-
conserving rotations. Alternative rotations C through G were assumed to be enrolled in 
Tier 2 CSP contracts. Organic rotations were assumed to address all resources of concern 
for the operation, resulting in Tier 3 CSP contracts. 
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V. Results 
Results of the rotation analyses are shown for various income definitions, from 
'net income without Government payments' to 'net income with all Government 
payments'. Impacts on net income of adding CSP payments are shown explicitly. 
The same farm program assumptions were applied to each rotation analyzed. The 
rotations all were applied to the same 1,000-acre "representative" farm that was described 
in Section III. In the following presentation, results are presented on a 'per acre' basis, 
derived from the 1,000-acre representative farm. 
A spreadsheet model was developed to allow all rotations to be compared on a 
systematic basis. Analyses started with the enterprise budgets for each individual crop. 
Each budget was generated from the CARE program and applied to the same 1,000-acre 
"representative" farm. The crops in each rotation were divided equally on the cropland 
of this farm. In the case of the baseline rotation, only com and soybeans were produced, 
which means there were 500 acres of com and 500 acres of soybeans planted. The longer 
rotations have less com and soybeans. For example, rotation D, which is an 8-year crop 
rotation, has only 250 acres each of com and soybeans and 125 acres for each stage of 
alfalfa development. The spreadsheet produced an average per acre net return for that 
specific rotation. 
The terms used to analyze profitability of rotations must now be explained. Net 
income without Government payments (NI w/o Govt payments) refers to the net return 
generated only from the sale of the crops in the rotation. Net income with program 
payments (NI w/ prog payments) includes income generated from the sale of the crops 
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plus any payments received from DPs, CCPs, or LDPs. Net income with all Government 
payments (NI w/ all Govt payments) includes all of the above plus any payments received 
from the CSP. 
Farm program payments in the rotation are shown on a per acre basis. The direct 
and counter-cyclical payments were calculated based on the assumptions presented in 
Section IV. The DP was $15.54 per acre and the CCP was $18.98 per acre for each 
rotation, when baseline crop prices were used. The payments remained the same for each 
rotation, since the same 'base acres and yields' were assumed for each rotation. In other 
words, even if a farmer operating the "representative" farm changes rotations, the DP and 
CCP calculations for that farm do not change. 
The LDPs for each rotation also are shown on a per acre basis. The LDPs 
resulted from the eligible crops assumed to be grown in each rotation. As previously 
stated, prices used for analyses were the 5-year average prices for each crop. With these 
prices, com, soybeans, oats, and winter wheat were eligible for LDPs. Winter wheat had 
the highest per bushel LDP of $.26, or $11.96 per acre. Com produced in the non-
organic rotations had a $.05 per bushel LDP, or $6.20 per acre, and non-organic-soybeans 
received an LDP of $.06 per bushel, or $2.22 per acre. The LDP for oats was $.05 per 
bushel, or $3.35 per acre. Spring wheat was the only crop not eligible for an LDP when 
baseline crop prices were assumed, since the PCP was greater than the loan rate. 
LDPs for organically produced crops are generally less than the conventionally 
produced crops on a per acre basis. Organically produced crops are eligible for LDPs 
even if the farmer receives a premium for the crop. Organically produced crops received 
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the same per bushel payment, but since the yields for some organically produced crops 
were assumed to be less than the non-organic yields, the LDPs per acre were less. 
LDPs for each crop are shown in the Table 5. The PCP is the 5-year average 
price that was used in the enterprise budgets. The loan rate represents the average 2002 
loan rate for the study region. 
Table 5. Loan Deficiency Payment Calculations 
Crop PCP Loan LDP Yield LDP 
Rate 
$/bu $/bu $/bu bu/ac $/ac 
Com $1.75 $1.80 $.05 124 $6.20 
Soybeans $4.77 $4.83 $.06 37 $2.22 
Winter $2.59 $2.85 $.26 46 $11.96 
Wheat 
Oats $1.30 $1.35 $.05 67 $3.35 
OrgCom $1.75 $1.80 $.05 112 $5.60 
Org $4.77 $4.83 $.06 31 $1.86 
Soybeans 
Org Oats $1.30 $1.35 $.05 67 $3.35 
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Baseline analysis 
Baseline rotations 1 and 2 were the rotations developed from the study region 
profile and County Educator and farmer interviews. These rotations represent the 
rotations that are mostly likely to be grown within the study region and serve as the basis 
for comparison to other rotations. They provide a basis for the estimated returns for a 
"representative" farm in the study region. 
Table 6 contains a summary of the economic results for all of the crop systems 
analyzed, including the baseline 1 and 2 reference rotations. Results are shown for net 
income without Government payments and net income with commodity-related program 
payments. 'Commodity payments' are also broken down into DPs, CCPs, and LDPs for 
each rotation. All results are shown in terms of a per-acre average for each rotation 
system. The portion of the table relating to CSP payments will be discussed later in this 
report. 
Baseline rotation 1 has one of the lowest net income without Government 
payment values. The average per acre return for the rotation is -$41.63. With the 
addition of the DP, CCP, and LDP, the net income with program payments return is 
-$2.90 per acre (Table 6). Inclusion of the DPs, CCPs, and LDPs, which total $38.73 per 
acre, causes the rotation to nearly break even (when the land charge of $90 per acre is 
included). 
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Table 6. Rotation Net Returns with Baseline Prices and Yields 
Nlw/o Total Nlw/ CSP 
Govt Prag Prag Base 
Crops Pavme~ LOP CCP DP Pavments Pavments Pavment 
cs -$41.63 $4.21 $18.98 $15.54 $38.73 -$2.90 --
o,s -$44.08 $4,21 $18.98 $15.54 $38.73 -$5.35 --
Cs SW ...l43.es 1101 $18.98 $15.54 $37.33 -$6,33 $4,20 
csww -$413.36 )9 $18.98 $15.54 $41.32 -$7.04 $4.20 
a,aa a,cs,c.s -$4.29 $2.11 $18.98 $15.54 $36.63 $32.34 $8.40 
o/a,a·.a a. o,s c s $2.48 $~$1E$.98 $15.54 $37.05 $39.53 $8.40 
o/a,a,a,a c s,c,s $5.30 $2.5 $18.98 $15.54 $37.05 $42~~ 
a;aac s,ww -$11.62. $3.40. $18 .. {18 $15.54 $37.92 $26.3 .40 
a.a.S.C.S:.WW -$9.,74 $3.40 $18.98 $15.54 $37. $28.18 $8.40 
sw/aa.~.a.c.s • $1:1:.-40 $1.40 $18;98 $15.54 $35.93 14!U3 $BAO 
sw/a,a,aia,c,s $1:1 .. 28 $1,,40 $18.98 $15.54 $35.93 $47.20 $8.40 
o/a,aa.csc -$1.27 $1.96 $18.98 $15.54 $36.48 $35 .. 22 $8.40 
c.s,o/aa -$24.4,5 $2.70 $18.98 $15.54 $37.23 $12.78 $12.60 
c,soia.a $62.02 $2.70 $18.98 $15.54 $37.23 $99.25 I $12.60 
. cs,o/a a a -$3.20 $2.16 $18.98 $1.5 • .54 $36.68 $33.48 $12.60 
c,s,ola,a,a $65.97 $2.16 $18.98 $15.54 $36.68 $102.65 $12.60 
CSP 
Cost Total NlwJall 
Share CSP Govt 
Pavment PavrnGl'll Pavments 
$0.QO -$2.90 
$0.00 -$5.35 
$4.20 -$2.13 
$4.20 -$2.84 
$5.85 $14.25 $46.59 
$5.94 $14.34 $53.86 
$6.94 $14 .. 34 $~.68 
$7.80 $16.20 $42:50 
$7.80 $18.20 $44.38 
$7.18 $15.58 $60•.91 
$7.18 $15.58 $62,79 
$7.91 $16.31 $51.53 
$8.54 $21.14 $33.92 
$8.54 $21.14 $120,3$ 
$6.83 $19.43 $52.91 
$6.83 $19.43 $122.09 
Baseline rotation 2, which has no-till soybeans, shows an even lower net income 
without Government payments (-$44.08 per acre). The rotation had -$5.35 per acre in net 
income with all Government payments (Table 6). Baseline 2 receives the same 
commodity program payments as baseline 1. The baseline 2 net income-however 
measured-is $2.45 per acre less than the baseline 1 net income. The difference can be 
attributed mostly to the higher seed cost for soybeans in a no-till system. If yields actually 
are higher, on average, for no-till soybeans than for soybeans rowed with a min-till 
planter, then the net income comparison would be different. 
The assumed com and soybean yields (Table 3) contribute to the negative net 
returns in the baseline systems. Although the yields may be considered low by some 
people, they do represent 5-year averages for the study region, based on SDASS data. 
While our analyses were based on 124-bushel com, yields at the Southeast Experiment 
Farm have ranged from 120 to 180 bushels an acre, depending on the year. 
Crop market prices used in the budgets also influence the net return results. As 
previously stated, the prices used were 5-year averages. In the case of com, the $1.75 per 
bushel price that was used is at least $.14 higher than the average price in three of the 
years used to compute the 5-year average. The soybean price of $4.77 per bushel that 
was used is higher than the average price in 4 of the years used to compute the 5-year 
average. The reader should keep in mind, however, that the CCPs and LDPs included in 
the profitability analyses for our representative farm have inverse relationships to com 
and soybean market prices. 
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The land charge used in the budgets is critical to the net return calculations. The 
not-quite-break-even net returns for the baseline com/soybean systems suggest that the 
$90 per acre cash rent fully captured Government payments. 
Analysis of diverse crop rotations 
The alternative and organic rotations shown in Table 2 represent forms of longer 
rotations that "representative" farmers might be enticed to adopt through CSP contracts. 
The rotations vary in length and crop mix. All rotations receive the same DPs and CCPs, 
based on previously stated farm program assumptions. LDPs differ among the rotations, 
however. 
Alternative non-organic rotations. The first alternative rotation developed was a 
com-soybean-spring wheat rotation, rotation A. Rotation A models a rotation being 
studied at SDSU's Southeast Experiment Farm. Although the rotation is only a slight 
variation from the baseline, the addition of spring wheat has some economic implications. 
The rotation has a net income without Government payments of -$43.66 per acre, 
similar to baseline rotations 1 and 2. Spring wheat is the only crop that does not qualify 
for an LDP based on the price assumptions used in the enterprise budgets. This leads to 
LDPs of only $2.81 per acre for the rotation, which is less than the $4.21 average per acre 
LDP in the baseline rotations. Net income with Government farm program (but not CSP) 
payments came to -$6.33 per acre for rotation A (Table 6). 
Rotation B-with winter wheat, rather than the spring wheat that is in rotation 
A-shows a greater net loss (excluding CSP payments) than rotation A and baselines 1 
and 2. The net income without Government payments for rotation B is -$48.36 per acre 
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and the net income with program payments is -$7.04 (Table 6). Winter wheat has a $.26 
per bushel, or $11.96 per acre, LDP. Consequently, rotation B has the highest average 
LDPs per acre of all the rotations. Nevertheless, the baseline rotations perform slightly 
better than rotation B in terms of net income with program payments. 
Rotation C is the first rotation analyzed that contains alfalfa. Previous research 
has shown that alfalfa can significantly enhance the profitability of a farming operation, 
but the relative contribution of alfalfa to overall profitability of any system is affected by 
the price received for alfalfa relative to the prices received for other crops (Henning and 
Dobbs). The alfalfa price used for all the rotations was the 5-year average, $66 per ton 
(Table 3). 
Rotation C is an alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-com-soybeans-com-soybeans 
rotation. This rotation incorporates a forage legume but also has a strong row crop 
presence. The alfalfa in this rotation is straight seeded in the first year, with one cutting 
taken in the establishment year. It was assumed that in the following years there would 
be three cuttings per year, with yields changing as the alfalfa stand ages. 
Rotation C has a net income without Government payments of -$4.29 per acre. 
Although this value is negative, it is substantially higher than any of the other rotation net 
returns discussed thus far. Rotation C is the first rotation analyzed that has a positive net 
income with program payments included. Including program payments, rotation C has an 
average per acre net return of $32.34. This value is $35.24 higher than the baseline 1 
value (Table 6). 
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The economic contribution of alfalfa to rotation C is substantial. Rotation C's net 
income without Government payments is very similar to the previously mentioned 
rotations' net income with program payments. Not only does alfalfa contribute directly to 
net returns, but also com following alfalfa in the budgets has lower input costs because of 
legume credits from alfalfa (Gerwing and Gelderman). 
Rotation C shows considerable economic incentive for producers to change to a 
longer rotation from the baseline rotation, but factors also exist that discourage producers 
from a longer rotation such as this. A study by Henning and Dobbs on the contribution of 
alfalfa to whole-farm profitability concluded that, although alfalfa may add profitability 
to a farm system, there appears to be more price risk associated with alfalfa than with 
grain and oilseed crops. The high establishment cost and price risk associated with 
alfalfa may be some of the reasons it is no longer included in many crop rotations. 
Rotation D was the first rotation in which we considered both GMO and non-
GMO seed varieties. The rotation consists of oats/alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-com-
soybeans-com-soybeans. The oats constitute a nurse crop for alfalfa. In the 
establishment year for alfalfa, the oats are harvested for grain and one cutting of alfalfa 
also is assumed to be harvested. Results show this rotation, with conventional seed, to be 
the third highest performing non-organic alternative rotation in the analysis. The 
conventional seed rotation has a net income with program payments of $42.34 per acre. 
The GMO version is just slightly lower, at $39.53 per acre (Table 6). The difference in 
net returns can be attributed mostly to seed costs. The estimated GMO seed cost for Bt 
com was $42 per acre at the time of our study, while the estimated conventional seed cost 
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was $28 per acre, a difference of $14. The estimated cost for RR soybeans in 30-inch 
rows was $29.04 per acre, while the estimated conventional seed cost was $19.04 per 
acre, a difference of $10. 
In this analysis, a farmer using GMO seed varieties appears to be at a slight 
economic disadvantage compared to one using conventional seed. However, research 
suggests that improved pest control is the major factor in farmers' adoption of GMO seed 
varieties (Van Scharrel and Van der Sluis). Improved yields and reduction of labor and 
herbicide costs also have been cited as key reasons farmers choose to grow Bt com and 
RR soybeans; Lacking a firm basis for assigning different yields to the GMO and non-
GMO crops, we assumed the same yields. To the extent GMO crops may actually 
average higher yields, the net return comparisons would differ from those reported here. 
Our main focus in this study was not a GMO/non-GMO comparison, however, so readers 
should exercise caution in drawing conclusions about whether or not to use GMO seed 
from our alternative versions of rotations D, E, and F. 
Rotation E involves 3 years of alfalfa and 1 year each of com, soybeans, and 
winter wheat. This rotation is the only rotation that uses a forage legume, row crops, and 
small grain as major crops. Other rotations contain all three, but the small grain is used 
as a nurse crop. The alfalfa is straight seeded in rotation E, and the winter wheat is not 
used as a nurse crop. 
Rotation E is not as profitable as other alternative rotations with alfalfa (Table 6). 
This can be attributed to the low price of winter wheat. Rotation E, however, does have 
significantly better net income figures than the baseline rotations. The conventional seed 
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variation of rotation E-as also noted for rotation D-is more profitable than the GMO 
variation. 
Both GMO and conventional seed versions of Rotation F also are shown in Table 
6. This is the most profitable non-organic alternative rotation. The conventional seed 
version results in $11.28 per acre of net income without Government payments, while the 
GMO figure is $9.40 per acre. The net income with program payments value for 
conventional seed is $47.20 per acre, and the GMO value is $45.33 per acre. These net 
income with program payments values are approximately $50 higher than the 
corresponding baseline rotation (com/soybean system) values. 
Spring wheat in rotation F is used as a nurse crop for establishing the alfalfa. In 
this rotation, the spring wheat is harvested as grain, and there is no alfalfa cutting in the 
first year. Oats are generally planted as a nurse crop for alfalfa, but spring wheat 
sometimes is used. A comparison between the straight seeded alfalfa, spring 
wheat/alfalfa, and oats/alfalfa enterprise budgets shows that establishing alfalfa with oats 
has the highest net return in the establishment year, given cost and yield assumptions we 
used. 
Rotation G has respectable net income figures and a considerable economic 
advantage over the baseline rotation systems (Table 6). This oats/alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-
com-soybeans-com rotation has an extra year of com relative to soybeans. One reason we 
included this rotation is that interviews indicated that recent changes in farm program 
commodity payments might lead some farmers to expand the share of com in their crop 
mix. 
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In summary, most of the alternative rotations analyzed here out-perform the 
baseline rotations (Table 6). Only rotations that include alfalfa show positive net 
incomes with Government program payments included. 
Organic rotations. Organic rotation systems are assumed by many people to 
generally represent relatively high levels of ecological stewardship. Certified organic 
rotations require the utmost attention to detail when selecting a crop rotation. Without 
the help of synthetic chemicals, an organic farmer must use careful management of crop 
rotations and tillage practices to ensure that insect, weed, and disease cycles are 
controlled. The CSP may provide economic incentives for some farmers to consider 
organic agriculture. We expected organic rotations to have potential to qualify for Tier 3 
CSP contracts. 
The organic rotation results are shown two ways in Table 6. Both organic 
rotations were analyzed with the conventional crop prices used in the alternative and 
baseline budgets. However, those same organic rotations also were analyzed using 
premium organic prices. Certified organic crops qualify for premium prices in the 
market, presented previously in Table 3. 
Organic rotation A is a com-soybean-oats/alfalfa-alfalfa rotation modeled after 
rotations in recent organic farming studies by Delate et al. and Porter et al., cited in 
Section III. Organic rotation A without the organic price premiums has a net income 
with program payments of $12.78 per acre. This value is considerably higher than those 
for the baseline rotations; however, the organic per acre return is less than the alternative 
rotations that include alfalfa. Analysis of organic rotation A assuming organic price 
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premiums leads to a quite different result, however. With premiums, this organic rotation 
out-performs the baseline and alternative rations by a considerable margin. With organic 
price premiums, organic rotation A's net income without Government payments is 
$62.02 per acre, much higher than that of the best performing non-organic rotation. 
Adding in Government program payments for organic rotation A results in a net income 
of $99.25 per acre (Table 6). 
Organic rotation B shows results similar to those of organic rotation A, when 
compared to the baseline and alternative rotations. Assuming conventional crop prices in 
organic rotation B, the net income without Government payments is -$3 .20 per acre; 
assuming organic price premiums, it is $65.97, $69.17 higher. Like rotation A, when 
assuming price premiums, the organic net income without Government program 
payments is higher than the baseline and alternative non-organic rotation net incomes 
with program payments. 
As shown previously in Table 3, the yields used in the organic budgets are lower 
than those in the non-organic budgets, except in the case of oats. The lower yields also 
translate into smaller LDPs for the organic crop rotations. Helping to offset those lower 
yields are lower input costs, because the organic budgets do not include any synthetic 
chemicals. Without synthetic chemical pesticides, weeds and pests must be controlled 
through mechanized practices and rotations. In the case of organic soybeans, hand labor 
was assumed to be employed, along with mechanized tillage practices. The extra 
mechanization and hand labor practices result in higher fuel, machinery, and labor costs 
for the organic rotations. 
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Organic budgets entail other additional costs. In the case of organic soybeans and 
oats, a cleaning charge was imposed, based on data obtained from Brummond and 
Swenson. A cleaning charge of $.45 per bushel was assessed in enterprise budgets based 
on organic price premiums. The charge was assessed only in the budgets with price 
premiums because a producer would likely omit the cleaning process if he or she were 
planning to sell organic grains or soybeans at conventional prices. 
The organic rotations included oats and alfalfa (oats/alfalfa) where oats are 
planted as a nurse crop. The oats are harvested as grain, but, unlike the non-organic 
budgets, the assumption for the organic rotations-based on interviews with organic 
farmers-is that there is no alfalfa cutting in the establishment year. 
The two different price scenarios for the organic rotations were used to show the 
relatively higher returns a farmer could realize when he or she is able to capture organic 
price premiums. However, an organic farmer might not receive organic prices for the 
entire harvest. The crop might not qualify for the premium because of poor quality. 
Also, farmers sometimes may have trouble gaining access to organic markets. Consumer 
demand for organic products has increased over time, but organic crop acreage accounts 
for a very small fraction of total crop acreage, resulting in a limited number of market 
outlets. Results shown in Table 6 for the organic rotations under the two different price 
scenarios-without and with organic premiums-should be viewed as ranges of potential 
net returns per acre. 
In summary, organic rotations have the highest potential per acre return when 
price premiums are included. Except for rotations A and B, all of the alternative and 
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orgarnc (both with and without pnce premiums) rotations examined have higher 
estimated per acre net incomes with program payments than do the baseline rotation 
systems (Table 6). These analyses, and other research, show that organic rotations can 
compete in many situations with conventional rotations. 
The contributions of government payments to net returns for each rotation system 
are illustrated graphically in Figure 3. The third bar in each comparison-representing 
net income with all government payments-includes the assumed CSP payments. Results 
of the analysis with those payments included are presented next. 
Inclusion of CSP payments 
The following analysis is focused on potential CSP payments and implications for 
the profitability of different rotation systems on the "representative" farm. Results are 
organized according to the CSP contract tiers described in Sections I and IV. 
Rotation systems were placed in different tier levels based on potential environmental 
gains associated with each one. The base payment is different for each tier level. Tier 1 
contracts receive the lowest base payment, while Tier 3 contracts receive the highest base 
payment. Cost share payments also vary, since each rotation has different costs that 
might be eligible for payments. Assumed CSP base and cost share payments for each 
rotation are shown in Table 6. 
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The alternative organic and non-organic rotations represent potential conservation 
crop rotations that provide environmental benefits. Consequently, they were assumed to 
be eligible for CSP contracts. On the other hand, we assumed that the baseline rotations 
do not qualify as conservation crop rotations, because of the very limited crop mix and 
the lack of a small grain or forage or green manure legwne. Therefore, the baseline 
rotations were not considered eligible for any level of CSP participation, simply by virtue 
of including two crops in the rotation. There may very well be conservation practices that 
a corn/soybean farmer could agree to carry out to qualify for some type of CSP contract, 
but non-rotation practices were not the focus of our analyses. 
Tier 1 contract. A CSP Tier 1 contract requires a producer to enroll only a portion 
of his or her farm in the program. A Tier 1 contract in this analysis receives a base 
payment of $4.20 per acre. Alternative rotations A and B were assumed to qualify for 
Tier 1 contracts, and we assumed that all 1,000 acres on the representative farm were 
enrolled. 
Rotations A and B were the shortest alternative rotations developed for this 
analysis. According to our assumptions, adoption of rotation A or B represents the 
minimum change a farmer might make that involves a change in rotation. Although these 
rotations differ from the baseline, the assumption was that the environmental gains 
associated with rotations A and B are not substantial enough to qualify for a Tier 2 
contract. Rotations A and B were assumed to qualify for a Tier 1 contract based on the 
environmental gains a farm operation may accrue as a result of winter or spring wheat 
being planted in rotation with com and soybeans. Language for a Tier 1 contract was 
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vague at the time of our study, but we assumed that a fanner could receive a CSP 
payment for implementing either rotation A or rotation B. The land rotated to wheat 
could be subject to less wind or water-induced soil erosion. We assumed that there would 
be no CSP cost share payments for these two rotations, because there are no significant 
'establishment' costs associated with adding wheat to the com/soybean rotation. 
Even with the CSP payments, returns to rotations A and B fail to cover all costs 
(Table 6 and Figure3). The CSP base payment is $4.20 per acre, and the net incomes 
with all Government payments-which include the CSP payments-for rotations A and 
B are -$2.13 per acre and -$2.84 per acre, respectively. These net incomes are similar to 
that of baseline 1 (with no CSP payment). 
Tier 2 contract. Alternative rotations C through G were assumed to qualify for 
Tier 2 contracts. Each rotation contains alfalfa and is at least 6 years long. These 
rotations have substantial crop mixes that include a forage legume and a small grain in 
addition to row crops. We assumed that these rotations would meet the requirements of a 
conservation crop rotation as defined by NRCS or a resource-conserving crop rotation as 
defined in the CSP legislation. 
Each Tier 2 contract requires the fanner to address at least one resource of 
concern for the entire agricultural operation. The resource concern in this analysis was 
not explicitly defined, but a resource-conserving crop rotation can address many resource 
concerns. Rotations C through G are long rotations that involve significant changes in 
crop mix, compared to the baseline rotations, and we assumed whole fann involvement 
for our representative farm. 
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A Tier 2 contract in this scenario receives a base payment of $8.40 per acre. We 
also assumed that rotations C through G would be eligible for cost share payments for the 
establishment cost of alfalfa. The cost share payments differ among rotations, because 
alfalfa is established using different methods over a different number of years; cost share 
payments range from $5.85 to $7.91 per acre. The total CSP payments for rotations C 
through Grange from $14.25 to $16.31 per acre (Table 6). 
These rotations already were more profitable than the baseline rotations before 
addition of the CSP payments. With the addition of CSP payments, an even stronger case 
can be made for the rotations to be considered by farmers. The CSP payments for Tier 2 
contracts are not large on a per acre basis, but the payments do add to the appeal of the 
alternative rotations. For example, a $15 per acre CSP payment on a 1,000-acre farm 
comes to $15,000. Rotations C through G with Tier 2 CSP contracts included show net 
incomes with all Government payments that are at least $45 per acre greater than net 
incomes for the baseline rotations (Figure 3). 
Tier 3 contract. The Tier 3 contract represents the highest level of participation. 
In this tier, the farmer and NRCS personnel design a resource management system 
addressing all resources of concern for the entire agricultural operation. We assumed that 
the organic rotations would qualify for Tier 3 contracts. Operating a certified organic 
farm generally requires the farmer to implement a production plan that incorporates at 
least some resource-conserving practices throughout the farm. It is quite possible that 
some organic farms would need to add some practices to those they are already carrying 
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out in order to qualify for a Tier 3 contract. However, those additional practices might 
well be eligible for additional CSP cost share that we have not included in our analysis. 
Tier 3 contracts receive the highest base payments. The representative farm with 
a CSP contract for an organic rotation in our analysis was assumed to receive a base 
payment of $12.60 per acre (Table 6). There also could be cost share payments for the 
establishment of alfalfa-$8.54 and $6.83 per acre for organic rotations A and B, 
respectively. These cost share payments, of course, represent annual averages for the 
whole (1,000-acre) farm. If stated in terms of only the acres rotated into new 
(establishment) alfalfa each year, the per acre cost share payments would be much higher. 
The total CSP payments received for a Tier 3 contract are $21.14 and $19.43 per 
acre for organic rotations A and B, respectively. The organic rotations appear to be 
competitive with a number of the non-organic rotations even without CSP contract 
payments, and the addition of CSP payments adds to their relative profitability. 
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VI. Summary 
We have already observed in Figure 3 how the addition of CSP payments adds to 
net returns of the various rotation systems in southeastern South Dakota. Net return 
effects of potential CSP payments are shown another way for selected rotations in Figure 
4. There, the only government payments that are included-in the second bar for each 
rotation-are CSP payments. Again, we see that the diverse rotations that include alfalfa 
(both organic and non-organic) are more profitable (or less unprofitable) than baseline 
rotation 1 (com/soybeans) and rotation A (com/soybeans/spring wheat), even without 
inclusion of CSP payments. The assumed CSP payments increase their profitability 
advantage, however. 
One possible conclusion might be that CSP payments are not needed to induce 
more diverse crop rotation systems such as those included in our analyses. However, 
previous studies have shown that even though alternative rotations appear to be 
competitive with typical com/soybean rotations, farmers tend to prefer the simple 
com/soybean rotation. Therefore, some added incentive, such as that provided by CSP 
contracts, may be necessary if policy makers desire to restore more ecologically diverse 
crop rotation systems in areas where com and soybeans are predominant. Even the CSP 
payment levels we assumed in our analyses would likely be inadequate to cause large-
scale crop rotation shifts, so long as other farm program income and price support 
payments remain high and are somewhat coupled to 'commodities'. 
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